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In this paper we examine the marginal impact of changing farm supply on the market
structure of the downstream food processing sector. We develop a theoretical model
that allows for cost differences among processors and endogenizes downstream entry
and exit. Comparative statics results are consistent with several well-established
trends in the food processing sector. In particular, the analysis demonstrates that
increasing concentration in the food processing sector is consistent with decreasing
market power. Indeed, we find that when the farm supply curve shifts outward, an
increase in concentration can only occur when there is a decrease in market power.
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Technical innovation leading to lower farm production costs has been a hallmark of American
agriculture, due in large part to the effectiveness of public research and extension activities
(Chavas and Cox, Cochrane). Technological regress also occurs in the farm sector as a result
of environmental regulations such as bans on
agricultural chemicals that increase marginal
production costs (Ebel, Hornbaker, and Nelson;
Forsythe and Corso; Lichtenberg, Parker, and
Zilberman; Sunding). Other well-known factors, such as insurance and stabilization programs, labor supply disruptions, land market
fluctuations, and the supply of rural credit, also
affect the position of the farm supply curve. In
this paper we characterize the marginal impact
of farm supply shifts on the market structure of
a downstream food processing industry. Understanding the effect of farm supply shifts on the
food processing sector is clearly important, particularly given the growing size of the processing industry and its significant impact on
farmer and consumer welfare.
The problem of oligopsonistic competition in
food processing has been analyzed recently by
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Chen and Lent, Just and Chern, Sexton, and
Wann and Sexton. Unlike these previous studies of the food processing sector, the model
presented in this paper allows for the possibility of cost differences among processors and
endogenizes entry and exit. Clearly, these
modifications are realistic. They also affect the
results in important ways. A main finding of Chen
and Lent, which is the paper most similar to ours,
is that the farm price can increase when the farm
supply curve shifts outward. This outcome occurs
only when individual processing firms greatly expand output in response to the shift. Our model
shows that an increase in the farm price in response to an outward shift of the farm supply
curve is much more likely than Chen and Lent
imply, since an outward shift in farm supply also
stimulates entry in the food processing sector. Our
model also reverses Chen and Lent's finding that
processor profit decreases following an outward shift in farm supply only when the farm
price increases. In our framework, an increase
in the farm price unambiguously increases profits in the processing sector, since an increase in
the farm price disproportionately affects inefficient processors and leads to higher profits for
efficient processors.
Our model also helps reconcile some well-established but seemingly contradictory empirical
results regarding the food processing industry.
Economists have noted with some alarm the recent increases in concentration in the u.s. food

processing sector. This concern arises from the
belief that increased concentration implies increased anticompetitive behavior and an associated reduction in the price of farm products. Yet,
counterintuitively, economists have also discovered decreasing levels of market power in food
processing industries. Evidence from the
meatpacking industry illustrates this paradox
well. Koontz, Garcia, and Hudson find that
meatpacker concentration increased in the fed
cattle industry between the 1980-82 period and
the 1984-86 period, while, overall, market power
decreased. Azzam and Schroeter simulate the impact of increased concentration in the beef packing industry on live cattle prices but find the price
impact, and hence the market power, to be small
due to a high estimated input supply elasticity. Finally, Schroeter and Azzam identify a trend toward decreasing market power in the hog processing industry during the period of increasing market concentration from 1976-1988. None of these
studies attempts to reconcile the empirical regularity of increasing concentration and decreasing
market power in food processing industries.
In the present paper we show that increasing
concentration and decreasing market power in a
processing industry are likely to occur simultaneously in response to a shift in farm supply.
Indeed, we find that when the farm supply
curve shifts outward, an increase in concentration only occurs when there is a decrease in
market power. When the farm supply curve is
inelastic, for example, market power in the processing sector is high, the farm price is low,
and a large number of inefficient firms are able
to produce. When the supply curve rotates
clockwise, however, market power decreases
and the farm price increases, which precipitates
the exit of inefficient processors from the market, thereby increasing concentration.
The paper is structured as follows. In the next
section, a theoretical model of oligopsony is
developed with reference to the food processing
industry. The model accounts for differences in
productive efficiency between firms and explicitly allows for entry and exit. The third section
presents comparative statics effects of a shift in
farm supply on market share, market power, the
price of farm products, processor profit, and the
equilibrium number of firms. In the final section, conclusions are drawn.

duces a homogeneous product (y), using a raw
farm product input (x). Firm i has the firm-specific production function

Model

I The reader should note that condition (C2) is likely to be met
in practical applications. Efficient processors may have lower marginal productivity at low levels of output, yet be operating at a
scale that is well beyond any crossing of marginal productivity
curves with relatively inefficient processors.

Consider an industry with N oligopsonistically
competitive food processors. Each firm pro-

where fi(X i) may differ from the production
function of firm j, 'v'i "# j. Firm i may have
higher marginal productivity due to scale
economies, to greater managerial efficiency, or
to the ownership of specific rent-generating
factors such as patents.
The difference in productive efficiency between processors is described by the following
condition: Firm i is more efficient in production
than firm j whenever

Condition (C 1) states that the marginal product
of firm i is greater than the marginal product of
firm j at the respective equilibrium levels of input use, x i * and xj *. Also, since we wish to derive the comparative statics effects of a shift in
farm supply, it is necessary to define the relative productive efficiency of processors with
respect to marginal changes in output. Specifically, we wish to eliminate from consideration
the somewhat unusual case in which a small,
relati vely inefficient processor has a lower marginal product than a large processor, yet has a
greater capacity to expand production. We
maintain the identity of firms by assuming that
a change in raw product use does not cause the
inefficient processor to expand output more
cost-effectively than the efficient processor:

Condition (C2) is imposed in order to avoid
ambiguity when we refer to the efficient firm
and it is a sufficient condition, though not necessary, for the results that follow. 1
Profit-maximizing behavior for all food processors is assumed. For firm i, the profit function is written as

(2)

1t i

= Pyi -

W(X)x i - Fi

where P is the price of final food products,
W(X) is the inverse supply function for raw
products, X is the sum of all farm products purchased by processors, and Fi is the firm-specific
fixed cost of processor i, a portion of which
may be sunk.
Processor i chooses the level of raw products
that maximize profit given by equation (2),
subject to the production constraint in equation
(1). Substituting the production function of processor i into the profit function of the ith firm
allows us to calculate first- and second-order
conditions for maximization,
(3)

For simplicity, firms in the baseline equilibrium are partitioned into two groups: m "efficient," or low-cost processors that each choose
raw product use of Xl; and n "inefficient," or
high-cost processors that each choose raw product use of x h • The aggregate use of raw products
in the processing industry, then, is the sum of
raw products purchased by all firms, X = nx h +
mx 1 •

It is now possible to focus attention on individual processor groups by inspecting the firstorder conditions of a representative low- and
high-cost firm:
(3a)

1t~1

= PI; -

W - WxX l

=0

and

and
(4)

1t~
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- 2Wx - WxxX i < 0

where identical conditions hold for firm j.
To address the possibility of entry in the
model, the number of firms in the industry is
treated as a continuous variable following
Besley, Mankiw and Whinston, and Seade. Entry (exit) in a food processing industry occurs
until processor profits are driven to zero. When
processors are characterized by differences in
productive efficiency, however, their profit expressions differ in equilibrium; low-cost processors receive efficiency rents, and the zero
profit condition may bind only on the least efficient processor(s). A shift in the farm supply
curve thus creates entry (exit) by altering the
profit margin of the least efficient processors in
the industry. While the entry of low-cost processors is likely to occur in the industry over
time, the entry incentive of efficient firms exists regardless of a marginal shift in farm supply. We do not attempt to reconcile the fact that
differences in productive efficiency are often
observed in processing industries but, instead,
begin the analysis from a baseline equilibrium
in which both low- and high-cost producers exist a priori. The number of low-cost firms is exogenous, thereby allowing the effect of a marginal shift in farm supply on the entry (exit) incentive of high-cost processors to be isolated
from the long-run entry incentive of efficient
firms. Without imposing restrictions on the entry of low-cost firms, the model degenerates to
a homogeneous firm equilibrium in which only
efficient firms produce.

where the second-order conditions for each representative firm are analogous extensions of expression (4).
We assume that the industry is initially in equilibrium. In equilibrium, the number of high-cost
processors in the industry, n*, must satisfy

The equilibrium value of n* is determined simultaneously with x l* and x h* in equations (3a),
(3b), and (5). It is assumed that n* is unique, as
is the case when at least a portion of fixed costs
are sunk (Besley, Vickers).

Effect of a Farm Supply Shift
Let 8 be a shift parameter in the farm supply
function; that is, W = W(X; 8). This formulation
of the supply shift parameter follows Chen and
Lent, Dixit, and Quirmbach. The inverse supply
function is written for the case of asymmetriccost oligopsony with reference to the output
level of each representative firm by letting 8
denote the output of low-cost competitors and
by letting y denote the output of high-cost competitors;
(6)

W= W(xh+(n-l)y+xl+(m-l)b;

8)

where the substitution has been made for total
raw product use, X, and where band yare introduced purely for notational convenience.

It is now possible to totally differentiate
equations (3a), (3b), and (5), making use of expression (6) and the identities 0 = Xl and y =x h •
Combining equations, the system is written as

1t~,X. + 1t~,'Y

1t~.x. + 1t~.'Y
1t 'hY

(7)
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curve is weakly concave (Wxx ~ 0) and becomes
more elastic following the shift (Wx9 < 0), both
low- and high-cost processors increase their use
of raw products. An outward shift in the farm
supply curve reduces the raw product use of incumbent firms when <I> < 0. 3
The effect of the supply shift on the equilibrium number of high-cost firms is

dn
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Evaluating the determinant of the coefficient
matrix (7) yields
D

= _(X h)2 Wx(Pflx =

_(Xh)2WxVI1t~x

••

Wx)[ Pf:x - 2 Wx - xhWxx]

< 0,

where Vi = Pf:x - Wx < 0 and where 1t~ x < 0 is
the second-order condition for the representative high-cost firm.
In the analysis that follows, it is useful to express the cross-elasticity of the marginal input
supply function with respect to Wx and We as <I>
= [WeWxx - WxWxeV The effect of a supply shift
on the raw product use of the representative
high-cost and low-cost firm is

(8)

where the expression in square brackets is
negative. Following an outward shift in farm
supply, expression (10) is negative; that is,
high-cost firms exit only under conditions that
determine expansion in equations (8) and (9).
The effect of the supply shift on the industry
use of raw products is expressed as

(II)

h
1
dX = xh(dn) + n(dx ) + m(dX )
dO
dO
dO
dO

Expression (II) shows that the use of raw products unambiguously increases in a period of
farm supply expansion whenever <I> ~ O. Conversely, an outward shift in the farm supply
curve results in a smaller use of raw products in
the sector when

and

(9)
where Wx ~ 0 and where the inequality x'- x h >
o follows from first-order conditions (3a) and
(3b) imposing condition (CI). Note that the
sign of each expression depends on the sign of
<1>, as both types of firms unambiguously expand output whenever <I> > 0 and contract when
<I> < O. Thus, during periods of outward farm
supply shifts (We ~ 0), when the farm supply

2 That is. cI> = (Tl - I)W,W,•• where Tl = (W.Wul/(W,W..l is the
cross-elasticity of W, and W•.

This perverse effect occurs when the farm supply shift has a small outward level effect relative to an inelastic rotation effect.
The effect of a supply shift on the equilibrium farm price is

(12)

dW'
dO

=
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Wx(X h)3 V1<l>
We + Wx dO =
D

3 Chen and Lent derive a similar condition for a symmetric-firm
oligopsony.

where the effect is positive or negative depending on the value of <1>. Positive values of <I> in
the model unambiguously lead to an increase in
the farm price.
It is now possible to examine the effect of the
supply shift on the market share of individua~
firms. Defining the market share of firm i as r'
= (Xi / X), the change in market share is calculated for each type of firm as
[X(dxijde) - xi(dXjde)]
X2

de

so that the market share of a representative firm
in each group is given by

market power of the largest, most efficient
firms. 4 It is easily verifiable that
(15)

IJ

where E = (dXldW)(WIX) is the elasticity of
farm supply. Expression (15) is equivalent to
the measure used by Chen and Lent for the case
of Coumot conjectures where we have replaced
the Herfindahl index with the m-firm concentration measure CR m • The effect of a farm supply
shift on the market power of low-cost firms is
dIJ

w (dXI)
{ ; de +
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This expression is analogous to the Lerner index of oligopoly power used by Appelbaum
and, in this context, represents the degree of

{Pfl XI[WV h- Wx(W+XhWx)]
DW2
xx
h
2
+ Wx X (W + XIWx)}

de

+ <1>[ Xl (P(!1x - !x~) - (1- r h)VI) + Wx(x l - x h)]}.
In a period of farm supply expansion, the first
term in each expression represents the loss of
market share for each type of processor, as an
outward shift of the supply curve stimulates entry of high-cost firms. In expression (14), note
that the term in square brackets is positive by
condition (C2), while the first term is negative.
Hence, the market share of incumbent firms
only increases following an outward shift of the
farm supply curve when <I> > O.
We next construct a measure for market
power, recognizing that the market power of
low-cost firms differs from that of high-cost
firms due to differences in productive efficiency. Consequently, we restrict attention to
low-cost processors and define market power
by the ratio between the profit margin and
price, or the Lerner index, for a representative
low-cost firm,

(X h )2 <I>

where the entire bracketed term is unambiguously positive. Thus, the change in market
power for the representative low-cost firm is inversely related to <1>.
It is also useful to analyze the effect of a supply
shift on the profit of a representative low-cost
processor. 5 The effect of a supply shift on the
profit of a representative low-cost processor is
l

( 17)
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where the substitution PI; - W = WxX' is made
using first-order condition (3a) and where the

4 Another alternative would be to use a weighted average of the
Lerner index to capture the degree of market power of a single representative firm. This approach, however, would be somewhat misleading as it would understate the market power of low-cost producers and overstate that of high-cost producers.
5 Note that the profit effect for low-cost processors also captures the entire profit effect in the processing sector, since only
low-cost processors have positive profit in equilibrium.

Table 1. Contingent Outcomes of a Shift in Farm Input Supply
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expression in brackets is negative by conditions
(C 1) and (C2). Hence, profits increase only
when <D > 0, a case associated with decreased
market power and an increase in the farm price.
The implication of expression (17) is exactly
the opposite of that of Chen and Lent, who find
a negative profit effect in cases where the farm
price increases. Our model generates the opposite result due to cost asymmetry between firms
and to entry conditions in the industry. That is,
while an increase in the farm price directly decreases the profitability of low-cost firms
through equation (3a), a higher farm price affects high-cost firms to a greater degree in
equation (3b) and leads, in most instances, to
the exit of high-cost processors from the market
through expression (5). Counterintuitively, the
net effect of an increase in the farm price is to
improve the profitability of low-cost processors.
Using expressions (12) through (17), it is
possible to draw inferences relating the shift in
farm supply to changes in the structural competitiveness of the food processing sector. Contingent outcomes of the model are presented in
table 1. In the table, we consider the cases that
arise under alternate values of We and <D. When
We = 0, the case is one of a rotation, but not a
shift in farm supply, while values of We < 0 and
We > 0 represent an outward shift and inward
shift of the farm supply curve respectively. All
three types of supply shift can occur as a result
of technological progress or regress in the farm
sector.
The influence of alternate values of <D on
market structure can be seen most clearly when
the shift in farm supply is suppressed. When We
= 0, the market structure in the food processing
industry depends critically on the change in

0

0

+

0

+
+

elasticity of the farm supply curve. When the
farm supply curve becomes more elastic as a
result of technical change (Wxe < 0), the equilibrium price of raw products rises, profits increase in the processing sector, high-cost processors exit the industry, incumbent firms expand production, and concentration increases.
Market power, however, declines. When the
shift in farm supply is suppressed, the first term
drops out of market share expressions (13) and
(14) and concentration and market power is inversely related in the industry. In cases where
the supply curve is inelastic, a high degree of
market power exists in the industry, yet an incumbent that expands output slightly at the
margin suffers a large increase in the price of
raw products relative to the case of elastic supply. Thus, the equilibrium farm price tend to be
low (and marginal product high) relative to the
case of elastic supply, which allows a larger
number of high-cost firms to produce. Conversely, when technical change causes the supply of raw products to become more elastic, the
farm supply curve is able to more readily absorb increases in production without creating
large, commensurate increases in the price of
raw products. Incumbent firms consequently
expand their use of raw products, increasing the
farm price and precipitating the exit of highcost firms in the industry. Suppressing level effects in the supply of raw products, a clockwise
rotation of the farm supply curve leads to decreased market power but also to output expansion by low-cost firms, to exit by high-cost
firms, and, hence, to increased market concentration.
When technological progress occurs in the
farm sector, a positive value of <D occurs in
cases when the farm supply curve becomes

more elastic following the outward shift in supply, or, alternately, when the farm supply curve
is concave (Wxx < 0). When the farm supply
curve is concave, an efficient firm is positioned
on a more elastic portion of the marginal input
cost curve than an inefficient firm and thus adjusts its raw product use to a greater degree in
order to restore its first-order condition. 6 Therefore, a concave farm supply curve gives efficient producers greater incentive to expand output in periods of technological progress while
in periods of technological regress the converse
situation arises and efficient firms contract output relative to inefficient firms.
Now consider the impact of technical innovation in the farm sector. In this case, a level effect shifts the farm supply curve outward by the
first term in expressions (10) through (14),
stimulating the entry of inefficient firms, raising the aggregate use of raw products, and decreasing the market share of incumbent firms.
These effects are strengthened when the farm
supply curve is convex and becomes more inelastic following the shift but countervailed
when the supply curve is concave and rotates in
a clockwise direction. Consequently, the observed increase in food processing market concentration is consistent with an outward shift in
farm supply only when cD > 0, which occurs
when the farm supply function is concave or
when farm supply becomes more elastic following the shift. Yet, whenever cD > 0, the market
power of low-cost processors unambiguously
declines. An outward shift and clockwise rotation of the farm supply curve is thus consistent
with the observed inverse relationship between
concentration and market power in the food
processing sector.
When cD > 0, the farm price increases and a
positive profit effect occurs in the processing
industry. For example, when the farm supply
curve rotates in a clockwise direction but does
not shift, the effect is to stimulate an output expansion by low-cost firms which pushes up the
equilibrium price of farm products yet increases industry profit as high-cost firms exit
the market. Counterintuitively, a positive price
effect not only increases welfare in the farm
sector but also leads to increased profitability
in the processing sector itself. Such an outcome
is only possible in a model that endogenizes entry and exit.
The model also can be used to assess welfare

6 Similar intuition is provided for the case of oligopoly by
Dierickx, Matutes, and Neven and by Hamilton and Sandin.

implications of alternative farm policies. Consider, for example, the effect of a farm output
subsidy. A per unit subsidy on raw products
shifts the farm supply curve outward in a parallel fashion (We < 0 and Wxe = 0). When the farm
supply curve is convex, a unit subsidy stimulates the entry of high-cost firms, decreases
concentration, increases market power, decreases the equilibrium price of raw products,
and reduces profit in the processing sector.
When the farm supply curve is linear (cD = 0), a
unit subsidy on raw products causes high-cost
processors to enter the industry and leads to decreased concentration, while market power,
low-cost processor profit, and the farm price remain constant. When the farm supply curve is
concave, a unit subsidy decreases market
power, increases the equilibrium farm price,
and reduces low-cost processor profits, yet a
subsidy has an ambiguous effect on processor
entry and on industry concentration. A unit tax
has the opposite effect in each case.

Discussion
The main purpose of this paper is to examine
the effect of a farm supply shift on the market
structure of an oligopsonistically competitive
processing industry. We demonstrate that a
broad range of outcomes is possible, depending
on the convexity of the farm supply function,
the direction of the level effect, and the change
in the elasticity of the farm supply curve created by the shift.
Theoretical explanation is provided to support the empirical regularity of simultaneously
increasing concentration and decreasing market
power in the food processing sector. Indeed, diminished market power is demonstrated to be a
necessary condition for increasing concentration in a regime of expanding raw product supply. When there is technological progress in the
farm sector, a positive level effect in farm supply creates a tendency toward declining concentration in the processing industry as highcost processors enter. An outward shift only increases concentration in cases where the farm
supply curve is concave or becomes more elastic as a result of the shift, conditions that are
associated with decreased market power. A central hypothesis is that increased processor concentration occurs during a period of technological progress only if market power decreases.
The inverse relationship between market
power and industry concentration occurs
largely due to entry conditions in the model.

When the entry of high-cost processors is unrestricted, industry concentration is shown to increase following an outward shift in farm supply only in cases where market power decreases. In other instances, such as when substantial entry barriers exist in food processing,
behavior in the market may be less purely conditioned by entry incentives and it is possible
that market power and industry concentration
are positively related. While most welfare implications, such as price and profit effects, are
related to the degree of market power in the industry, meaningful implications cannot arise
from observing concentration measures alone.
Future research is needed in individual processing industries to account for industry-specific
factors such as entry that condition behavior in
the market.
The model also has interesting implications
for the welfare effects of farm policies. For example, price supports, research and development programs, agricultural chemical bans, and
worker protection policies all affect the position of the farm supply curve. In order to adequately understand the ultimate impacts of
these policies on farmer, processor, and consumer welfare, accurate modeling of the imperfectly competitive food processing sector is essential.
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